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Abstract 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of frequent testing on the 
performance of undergraduate freshmen. 
Methodology 
The impact evaluation of the intervention is designed as a field experiment -a 
randomized control trial. First, instructor divided the class in groups of three students 
in a joint-liability framework, a setting that fosters peer monitoring among students. 
Then, the groups were randomly assigned to high-frequency testing (tests on a weekly 
schedule) or a low-frequency testing (tests on a biweekly schedule). Each testing 
condition lasted for 15 weeks, and data on academic achievement were collected both 
before and after the intervention. 
Findings 
Although high-frequency groups show a higher mean performance on academic results, 
the findings do not indicate a definitive improvement in performance in weekly versus 
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biweekly testing. We related our findings with recent discoveries on students’ 
perception of frequent assessments and its relation to motivation.  
 Originality 
A large body of educational literature investigates the effect of the frequency of testing 
on learning performance. Less attention has been devoted to explore the mechanisms 
behind that relationship. We contribute to this emerging literature analyzing the effect 
of test frequency on a sample of Uruguayan university students, in a novel setting (a 
joint-liability framework), exploring mechanisms and suggesting lessons for future 
research.  
Keywords: frequent assessment; intrinsic motivation; grades; perceptions; classroom 
field experiment; feedback; procrastination   
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Introduction 
Is it better to test students more or less frequently? From the perspective of 
instructors, frequent testing in their courses implies additional work, but maybe it will 
not be reflected in student learning. Moreover, administering frequent evaluations 
consumes valuable instruction time that could be employed in teaching rather than 
testing. In addition, students may study less when given more exams because the overall 
weight of each exam on the overall class grade is lower. We carry out a field experiment 
to assess the effect of frequent examinations on the academic performance of university 
students. We perform this impact evaluation in a novel setting, a joint-liability framework, 
where students are jointly responsible for their homework. We contribute also 
discussing mechanisms behind our findings and relating them with recent educational 
and psychological approaches.  
A large body of educational literature investigates the effect of the frequency of 
testing on learning performance (Bangert-Drowns, Kulik, & Kulik, 1991; Kika, 
McLaughlin, & Dixon, 1992; Murphy & Stanga, 1994; Black & Wiliam, 1998; Domenech 
et al., 2015; Schrank, 2016; Adesope, Trevisan, & Sundararajan, 2017; Adkins & Linville 
2017). This literature finds mixed results. Less attention has been devoted to explore the 
mechanisms behind the relationship between test frequency and performance, though 
this link may be key to understand the mixed results. 
Previous literature has presented these mechanisms under two main channels. In 
the first place, students who procrastinate their effort may end up studying more when 
examinations are frequent and focused on a small number of issues. Ariely & 
Wertenbroch (2002) suggest that people have self-control problems and, to avoid them, 
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choose costly deadlines as a commitment device to improve their academic performance. 
In second place, frequent examinations offer students quick feedback of their results, 
that is, a tangible way to measure their progress during a class and to become aware of 
their strong and weak areas. These two mechanisms could foster students’ academic 
performance. In a similar vein, Bandiera, Larcinese, and Rasul (2015), Cabrera and Cid 
(2017), and Azmat and Iriberri (2010) focus on the effect of feedback provision on student 
performance, finding mixed results. 
Disentangling feedback effect from the anti-procrastination effect 
De Paola and Scoppa (2011) carry out a field experiment to assess the effect of 
frequency and disentangle the quick feedback effect from the anti-procrastination effect. 
Students in the treatment group were allowed to undertake an intermediate examination 
covering the first part (module 1) of the course material and a final exam (module 2) 
covering exclusively the second part, while students in the control group were permitted 
to undertake exclusively the final examination (covering the whole course material) at 
the end of the course program. Firstly, they compare treatment and control group results 
for Module 1, the material on which only treated students had previously been tested. 
Because only the treatment group was required to take an intermediate exam on this 
module but both experimental groups were provided with the intermediate exam 
solutions, they call this result the "workload division or commitment effect." Secondly, 
in order to isolate the feedback effect, they compare the difference in performance of 
treated students between the two modules. Treated students in both modules benefit of 
the anti-procrastination effect, but only for the second module they can obtain positive 
effects from feedback. 
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We offer a novel setting to explore the quick feedback effect and the anti-
procrastination effect: we built a joint-liability framework. Though we were not able to 
disentangle both effects by this new framework, we offer some lessons for further 
research. We carry out a field experiment involving undergraduate students enrolled in 
a Uruguayan university attending two introductory economics courses. In each 
classroom, the instructor divided all students in groups of three individuals. Instructor 
provided a premium to take-home tests’ grade if every member of the group met two 
requirements: having a grade of at least 6 in the take-home test (in a scale from 1 to 12, 
where 6 is the pass grade and 12 is the best grade), and having no absences during the 
week in which the take-home test had to be handed in. It is a novel framework for 
education, inspired in the microfinance literature (Banerjee et al., 2015; Crepón et al., 
2011; Becchetti & Pisani, 2010; Duflo et al., 2013) where individuals are jointly 
responsible for the loans of their group (if all members of a group repay their loans, they 
are eligible for second loans). In an education context, Cabrera and Cid (2013) found that 
this joint-liability framework improves academic performance by peer monitoring (and 
could foster the anti-procastrination effect in our current research).  
Within this joint-liability framework, we randomly assigned, in each classroom, 
half of the groups to high frequency testing and half to low frequency testing. Lectures 
were distributed along 15 weeks. High frequency treatment consists of sixteen take-
home tests, while the control group consists of the usual eight take-home schedule (low 
frequency). This setting generates exogenous variation it the frequency of testing. While 
the low-frequency groups face one take-home test every 2 weeks, the high-frequency 
groups have to hand in a test every single week.  
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We expect students with high frequency take-home tests to improve their 
academic performance in comparison to those with low frequency take-home tests, as a 
result of being more frequently exposed to testing. We do not only analyze students´ 
performance in the intervention courses, but also the spillover effects, i.e. the effect on 
the academic outcomes at the other courses taken in the same semester.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain the design of the 
experiment and we provide information about the grading system at the University of 
Montevideo. In Section 3 we explain our empirical methodology and show our results 
on the effects of testing frequency on grades obtained by students. Section 4 concludes. 
 
Program and Experiment Design 
Our experiment was implemented with 48 freshmen enrolled in Macroeconomics 
and Descriptive Economics courses at University of Montevideo during the 2012 
academic year. The University of Montevideo is a middle-sized private University 
located in the capital of Uruguay. It has currently about 3,500 students enrolled in 
different degrees. At the beginning of the Macroeconomics and Descriptive Economics 
classes (in August 2012) students were informed of the experiment both through 
presentations during the teaching hours and through a letter, sent to all students, 
explaining the format of the experiment. As instructors of both courses, we asked 
students to register to join the experiment.  
Macroeconomics and Descriptive Economics courses were structured in the same 
way: a midterm exam (35% of the final grade), take-home tests (15%) and a final exam 
(50%). Each course consisted of sixty classes of fifty minutes, distributed throughout 
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fifteen weeks. Students were allowed to have up to 15 absences. The grading system and 
requirements are similar to other courses at the University. The courses started in 
August 2012 and lasted until November. In each course, Treatment and Control groups 
attended the class in the same room, at the same time and with the same instructor and 
teaching material. 
The aim of the intervention is to test whether high frequency take-home tests 
improve academic performance under a joint-liability framework. Firstly, in each 
classroom, the instructor divided all students in groups of three individuals. Instructors 
provided a premium to take-home tests’ (a 20% increase in the grade) if every member 
of the group met certain requirements: having a grade of at least 6 in the take-home test 
(in an scale from 1 to 12, were 6 is the pass grade and 12 is the best grade), and having 
no absences during the week in which the take-home test had to be handed in. Secondly, 
with the approval of the ethical review board of the university, we designed a 
randomized trial. Students were randomly assigned to high or low-frequency 
examinations. Using this evaluation design we avoided self-virtuous group selection: 
lazy students could have self-selected into the low frequency group. Half of the three-
student-groups were assigned to the sixteen take-home testing (high frequency 
treatment), while the others were assigned to the eight take-home testing (low frequency 
or control group). 
Take-home tests did not require team work. Moreover, students were allowed to 
prepare the take-homes individually, with their friends or with their three-student-
group. The only intervention of the experiment was to change the frequency of the tests 
(under this joint-liability framework used to minimize the procrastination channel). At 
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the beginning of the lecture, each student was required to hand in the solutions in a 
personal sheet. It is important to note that the content of the 16 take-home tests is exactly 
the same as the content of the 8 take-home tests. So, the treatment is a variation in the 
frequency of the exercises, not in the total amount of exercises each student has to complete 
during the course (each take-home test of the low frequency group consists of exactly 
the same exercises that are include in two take-home tests of the high frequency group). 
A potential concern is that we, as instructors, may have introduced some bias in 
the grading of treatment and control groups. It was not possible for us to be ignorant of 
student treatment status because we graded twice as many take-home exams for treated 
students. In principle, this could have influenced how we graded student work or 
behaved towards students, biasing the experimental results. We address this concern by 
three simultaneous strategies. First, nearly all of the content of the examinations 
(homework, mid-term exam and final exam) are exercises. The exercises demand 
numeric results and facilitate an objective grading. Second, after grading home tests and 
exams, we handed the marked tests to students, and provided the solutions and the 
criteria of grading employed. The students therefore had the opportunity to compare 
their grades with the other students and complain if they identified any unfair grading. 
Third, we did not include any grading of the oral participation of students at classes. The 
grading of oral participation may have been too subjective and it would be difficult to 
keep the same criteria for every student. 
There were 48 students in this field experiment: 24 in Macroeconomics and 24 in 
Descriptive Economics. As Figure 1 shows, in August 2012, all 48 applicants were asked 
to complete a survey. Thus, we collected baseline data on a wide array of students 
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characteristics such as age, gender, working hours, hours devoted to sports and 
volunteering, high school of origin, region of the country they came from, commute time 
to university, academic expectations and number of friends in the classroom. Table 1 
provides descriptive statistics for our sample of students. The average student is 20 years 
old and has an average grade of 7.5. One third are from the inland of the country, nearly 
42% are female and approximately 30% of the students come from two private high 
schools in Montevideo. Nearly 10% of the students in the classroom have a job, 19% do 
volunteer work and, on average, the students in the intervention practice sports 5 hours 
a week. With respect to the student’s social behavior, we find that they devote 33% of 
their study time to studying in groups. When students were asked about the number of 
classmates they considered friends, we find that, on average, 13% of them are so. 
Similarly, the average percentage of unknown classmates is 60%.  
Half of the students (24) were randomly assigned to the high frequency take-
home testing while the other half (24) were assigned to the low frequency testing group. 
Students were informed by email of their assignment status and the list of students 
belonging to the Treatment and Control group was published on the classes’ web-pages. 
Table 2 shows that the randomization was successful in creating comparable 
treatment and control groups in observable characteristics, since both groups are 
balanced in seventeen observable variables.  
Some students suffered attrition. It is usual that students drop out from some 
courses during the semester due to different reasons (e.g. freshmen students usually 
change to other degrees and some students drop out before taking the midterm exam). 
In November 2012, six students dropped out of the program (2 students from the 
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Treatment group and 4 students from the Control group). We gathered some outcomes 
(follow-up administrative data) for those who suffered attrition, but we could not collect 
the information on all the outcomes of interest for the whole sample (e.g. grade in 
midterm exam). Therefore, taking this into account, we compared pre-treatment 
characteristics of the individuals that suffered attrition and the students that remained 
in the Treatment/Control groups. We found that all the pre-treatment variables remain 
balanced. Moreover, we have tested the differential attrition by treatment status and 
obtained the same results (results are available from the authors upon request). 
Method 
High Frequency vs. Low Frequency Take-Home Tests  
Formally, we assume that student performance is determined as follows: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑇𝑖 + 𝑑𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝑓 + 𝑒𝑖 
where 𝑌𝑖 is one of the outcomes of interest for student i (grade in midterm exam, grade 
in final exam, average grade in take-home tests1, average grade in midterm exams and 
homework of other simultaneous courses, average grade in final exams of other 
simultaneous courses, the student’s cumulative grade point average)2, 𝑇𝑖 is the 
parameter of interest: a dummy variable that takes the value one if student i is assigned 
to high frequency testing (16 take-home tests) and zero otherwise, 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖 is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if student i belongs to the Macroeconomics course and 
zero otherwise, 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of student characteristics at baseline, and 𝑒𝑖 is the error 
                                                          
1 These three grades are standardized. Standardized grades are calculated by subtracting the 
course mean (Descriptive Economics or Macroeconomics) and dividing by the course standard 
deviation. We do not include the 20% prize in the average grade in take-home tests. 
2 In Panel B of Table 1 we present a description of the outcome variables at the follow-up. 
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term. Because of the random assignment and the inexistence of non-compliers, we 
estimate the equation using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
Besides standard confidence intervals in our OLS estimations we implemented 
permutation tests. The advantage of this method is that it is valid even with small 
samples and does not rely on the distributional characteristics of the data (Rossi, 2014; 
Bloom et al. 2013). The null hypothesis of this test is that both samples come from the 
same distribution. The permutation test takes all possible combinations of group 
membership and produces a permutation distribution. In other words, if we assume 
both samples came from the same population, a data point in the high frequency testing 
group (Treatment group) is just as likely to appear in the low frequency testing group 
(Control group). If we determine all possible permutations, we can compute our statistic 
of interest for each permutation and create a distribution. We can then measure where 
our original statistic falls in this distribution. If it is in the tails then we have evidence 
that our two samples come from two different populations. We performed 10,000 
permutation tests and calculated the t-statistics for every outcome. Once this was 
estimated, we obtained the 2.5% (t0.025) and 97.5% (t0.975) percentiles of the t-test 
distribution. In the case that t-values were greater than t0.975 or smaller than t0.025, it could 
be stated that the difference is significant at the 5% level and therefore the treatment 
effect would have been significant. 
Table 3, Panel A, reports the effect of the treatment on the educational outcomes 
(grade in midterm exam, grade in final exam and average grade in take-home tests) in 
comparison to the control group. Although students assigned to high-frequency 
examinations show a higher mean performance on academic outcomes, these results do 
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not indicate a definitive improvement in the performance of students in the weekly 
treatment relative to biweekly testing. 
Finally, examining students’ performance in other courses, in Table 3 Panel B we 
show that the pressure exerted on treated students by frequent testing does not cause a 
substitution effect (treated students may have diverted effort from other courses in order 
to earn the bonus in Macroeconomics and Descriptive Economics). We study the 
following outcomes: average grade in midterm exams and homework of other simultaneous 
courses, average grade in final exams of other simultaneous courses, and the student’s cumulative 
grade point average. We find that treated students did not perform worse in non targeted 
examinations or in their cumulative GPA, compared to students in the control group.  
We are not able to rule out the possibility that our zero impact results could be 
explained by the lack of statistical power. With only 48 students in the sample (42 after 
attrition), the study has limited power to detect significant treatment effects. To detect 
an effect of 0.46 standard deviations (the point estimate for midterm exam grade 
reported in Table 3), we have power of only 0.36. In other words, even if the true effect 
size were 0.46 standard deviations—a large effect for an education intervention—we 
would only detect this effect roughly one of every three times we ran the experiment.  
Discussion 
Recent research has tried to investigate the effects of teaching and evaluation 
practices on student performance. An important issue concerning this topic regards the 
optimal number of examinations. In this paper we contribute to this emerging literature 
analyzing the effect of test frequency and feedback provision on a sample of Uruguayan 
university students. We conducted a randomized field experiment involving 48 
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undergraduate students enrolled at a middle-sized university and attending two 
introductory economics classes. Students participating in the experiment were randomly 
assigned to a Control group (low-frequency testing) and to a Treatment group (high-
frequency testing). Previous literature has scarcely investigated the different 
mechanisms that link frequent testing and academic performance. To explore those 
mechanisms, we employ a novel setting –a joint-liability framework- that fosters peer 
monitoring among students. Although the high-frequency groups show a higher mean 
performance on academic results, our findings do not indicate a definitive improvement 
in performance in weekly versus biweekly testing. Finally, the higher mean performance 
of treated students in targeted courses does not seem to have been obtained at the 
expenses of results earned in other courses.  
What could explain this lack of impact? Though we are not able to rule out the 
possibility that our findings could be explained by the lack of statistical power, we now 
explore some answers from previous educational and psychological literature that may 
provide lessons for further research. Hattie and Timperley (2007) offer evidence that 
shows that the type of feedback and the way it is given can be differentially effective. 
They propose a model of feedback that identifies the particular properties and 
circumstances that make it effective, and some typically thorny issues are discussed, 
including the timing of feedback and the effects of positive and negative feedback. For 
instance, students can increase their effort, particularly when the effort leads to tackling 
more challenging tasks or appreciating higher quality experiences rather than just doing 
“more.” In a similar vein, recent findings from psychology show the importance of 
trying to understand and mitigate the possible negative effects of frequent assessments. 
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Vaessen et al. (2017) is the first study that focuses on the perception of students regarding 
the specific intervention of frequent assessment, and they develop a new instrument to 
test students’ perceptions. Their analysis shows that four aspects of perception of 
frequent assessment could be distinguished. The first one is the value that students 
attribute to frequent assessment. Teachers should take into account the nature of a course 
and students’ initial intrinsic motivation when designing assessments. When the initial 
intrinsic motivation is high, it might be better to use assessments that do not feel 
controlling (i.e. non-obligatory and feedback only). The second aspect of students’ 
perceptions of frequent assessments found in Vaessen et al (2017) is labelled formative 
function. This aspect reflects whether students believed they had used the results from 
frequent assessments in their learning processes. The third and fourth aspects of the 
students’ perceptions are positive effects and negative effects. These aspects reflect the 
perceived impact of frequent assessments on self-confidence and stress: either less stress 
and more self-confidence for positive effects, or more stress and less self-confidence for 
negative effects. Vaessen et al (2017) concludes showing the relevance of including 
students’ perception of assessments in research on assessment: communication with 
students about the purpose and benefits of frequent assessments could be the key to 
reducing possible negative effects from graded frequent assessments and increasing 
students’ effort on non-graded frequent assessment.  
Next, we offer other lessons and hypotheses for further research. Firstly, when 
testing is too recurrent, students may not have enough time to deepen their knowledge 
and to understand the relationships among the range of concepts covered in a given 
subject. Secondly, although students in the low frequency group had to hand in their 
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tasks every two weeks, they could get a head start by studying with those in the 
treatment group which would push our estimates towards zero (because of positive 
spillover effect). Future experimental designs may include slightly different take-home 
tests (for instance, different exercises but of the same difficulty) for Treatment and 
Control groups in order to avoid spillover effects resulting from Treated and Control 
group students studying together. Thirdly, the difference in the frequency of take-home 
tests may be too small to find any differences in effort among students; or the duration 
of the intervention (15 weeks) may be too short of a time to see changes in habit 
formation. Thus, the long-term effect of learning could be incorporated. Frequent 
assessment may influence how students spread their study. Studying regularly, instead 
of cramming, may benefit long-term retention of study. Fourthly, studying how the class 
and group size as well as prize size may change the results in the joint-liability 
framework remains for future research. The costs of monitoring each other may be too 
high, leading students to prefer to lose the prize, regardless of the frequency of their 
take-home tests. Fifth, the joint-liability framework employed in the present experiment, 
did not allow us to disentangle the feedback effect from the anti-procrastination effect. In the 
vein of De Paola and Scoppa (2011), in order to isolate the feedback effect, we should have 
designed ways to keep similar incentives to procrastinate between treatment and control 
group. The presence of peer monitoring due to the joint-liability framework may diminish 
the propensity to procrastinate, but is unlikely to eliminate it. For instance, students in 
the treatment group were incentivized to study each week for take-home tests, while 
students in the control group could procrastinate in the first week because the take-home 
tests were due every two weeks. Moreover, low frequently groups could procrastinate 
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the task to the last minute. Both the feedback frequency and incentives to procrastinate 
therefore varied between treatment and control groups. Grades on other exams and in 
other courses would similarly conflate the feedback frequency and reduced 
procrastination mechanisms. For future investigations, we should try to identify the 
feedback effect by removing the procrastination channel. That design may follow De 
Paola and Scoppa (2011) in holding both the exam timing and material covered constant 
between treatment and control, while providing more frequent feedback for the 
treatment group. Finally, further research may replicate our investigation but with non-
mandatory courses, and with courses from other majors, to explore heterogeneity. 
One caveat of our randomized experiment may be that the conclusions are 
limited to undergrad students from a similar background, that is, freshman students 
taking introductory courses. Nevertheless, we believe that this pilot study has explored 
interesting mechanisms and novel frameworks for assessing the effect of frequency of 
testing, which may be useful in other contexts.  
Students’ learning processes and learning outcomes are strongly influenced by 
the assessment system (Gibbs and Simpson, 2004). Vaessen et al. (2017) provides 
examples showing that, if well designed, assessment and resulting feedback can 
contribute to and improve the learning process; but if designed poorly, assessment can 
hinder learning by causing anxiety, low self-esteem, low motivation for learning and 
inappropriate study behaviors such as surface approaches to learning and cramming. 
Once stakeholders realize the cognitive and non-cognitive mechanisms behind the 
effects of frequency of testing, findings of this evidence-based research may be used to 
inform educational practice. 
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Table 1 - Definition of baseline characteristics and outcome variables 
 
Description of the variables Mean S.D. Min Max Observations 
A) Baseline Characteristics 
           
Age (in months) Student’s age (in months) 240.7 24.36 218.8 320.7 48 
Work 
Dummy variable (1= Student 
works, 0= Student does not 
work) 
0.104 0.309 0 1 48 
Volunteering 
Dummy variable (1= Volunteer 
at social activities, 0= otherwise) 
0.188 0.394 0 1 48 
High school 1 
Dummy variable (1= Student 
attended High School 1, 0= 
Student did not attend High 
School 1) 
0.167 0.377 0 1 48 
High School 2 
Dummy variable (1= Student 
attended High School 2, 0= 
Student did not attend High 
School 2) 
0.146 0.357 0 1 48 
Inland 
Dummy variable (1= Student is 
from the Inland of Uruguay, 0 
=Student is from the Capital) 
0.333 0.476 0 1 48 
Hours of sport per week 
Hours spent doing sports per 
week 
5.360 3.945 0 15 48 
Satisfaction with 
classmates 
Student’s satisfaction with 
classmates. Scale: 1-very 
unsatisfied, 5-very satisfied. 
4.146 0.899 1 5 48 
Average grade 
Total average grade 
accumulated in the student’s 
career. (Min=0, Max=12) 
7.556 2.103 0 11.2 48 
Female 
Dummy variable (1=Female, 
0=Male) 
0.417 0.498 0 1 48 
Bachelor in economics 
Dummy variable (1= Student is 
studying for a bachelor in 
economics, 0=Student is 
studying for a bachelor in 
management or accountancy) 
0.583 0.498 0 1 48 
Travel time to university 
(minutes) 
Minutes spent travelling to 
university 
24.313 18.506 10 120 48 
Course 
Dummy variable (1= course in 
Macroeconomics, 0= course in 
Descriptive Economics) 
0.500 0.505 0 1 48 
Study in group (in % of 
the time) 
Percentage of time that students 
study in group 
0.335 0.199 0.020 0.82 48 
Friends (%) 
Percentage of friends in the 
course 
0.125 0.126 0 0.455 48 
Still unknown (%) 
Percentage of students that are 
unknown 
0.605 0.291 0 1 48 
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Educational Aspirations 
Scale: 1- Bachelor unfinished, 2-
Hold a Bachelor’s degree, 3-Hold 
two bachelor’s degrees, 4-Hold a 
master’s degree, 5- Hold a Ph.D. 
degree 
3.604 1.106 2 5 48 
 
 
B) Outcomes at Follow-up 
Grade in midterm exam 
(standardized) 
Standardized grades in 
midterm exams. (Scale in 
midterm exams: Min=0, 
Max=12). 
0.000 0.988 -1.876 1.436 42 
Average grade of take 
home-tests 
(standardized) 
Standardized grade of take 
home-take tests (Scale in take-
home tests: Min=o, Max=12). 
0.000 0.989 -2.661 1.529 46 
Grade in final exam 
(standardized) 
Standardized grade in final 
exam (Scale in final exams: 
Min=0, Max=12). 
0.000 0.987 -1.825 2.004 40 
Total average grade 
accumulated in the 
student’s career 
Total average grade 
accumulated in the student’s 
career after the intervention. 
(Min=0, Max=12) 
7.623 1.954 0 10.5 48 
Average grade in 
homework & midterm 
exams in other 
simultaneous courses 
Average grade in homework & 
midterm exams in 
simultaneous courses (not the 
intervention ones). Min=0, 
Max=12. 
7.615 1.559 4 11.25 47 
Average grade in other 
simultaneous final exams 
Average grade in 
simultaneous final exams (not 
the intervention courses). 
Min=0, Max=12. 
7.995 1.477 5.25 10.75 47 
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Treatment Control Difference 
Standard 
error 
P-value 
Age (in months) 236.214 245.273 9.059 6.984 0.201 
Work 0.083 0.125 0.042 0.090 0.645 
Volunteer 0.167 0.208 0.042 0.115 0.719 
High school 1 0.125 0.208 0.083 0.109 0.449 
High School 2 0.167 0.125 -0.042 0.104 0.690 
Inland 0.375 0.292 -0.083 0.138 0.550 
Hours of sport per 
week 
5.221 5.500 0.279 1.150 0.809 
Satisfaction with 
classmates 
4.208 4.083 -0.125 0.262 0.635 
Average grade 7.879 7.233 -0.646 0.606 0.292 
Female 0.458 0.375 -0.083 0.145 0.568 
Bachelor in economics 0.625 0.542 -0.083 0.145 0.568 
Travel time to 
university (minutes) 
25.291 23.333 -1.958 5.392 0.718 
Group (1= 
Macroeconomics, 0 = 
Descriptive 
Economics) 
0.500 0.500 0.000 0.147 1.000 
Study in group (in % 
of the time) 
0.337 0.333 -0.004 0.058 0.945 
Friends (%) 0.142 0.108 -0.035 0.036 0.343 
Still unknown (%) 0.584 0.625 0.041 0.085 0.627 
Educational 
Aspirations 
3.708 3.500 -0.208 0.321 0.520 
Observations 24 24 0   
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Table 3 - The effect of high frequency tasks on academic achievement by outcome 
 
Treatment Control Diff 
Standard 
error 
p value Observations 
Panel A       
Effects on educational 
outcomes 
      
Grade in midterm 
exam (standardized) 
.219 -.241 -.460 .300 .132 42 
       
Grade in final exam 
(standardized) 
.096 -.118 -.215 .315 .499 40 
       
Average grade of take 
home-tests 
(standardized) 
.025 -.028 -.054 .308 .861 42 
 
Panel B 
Spillover effects 
      
       
Average grade in 
homework & midterm 
exams in other 
simultaneous courses 
7.958 7.4368 -.521 .494 .297 42 
       
Average grade in other 
simultaneous final 
exams 
8.231 7.962 -.268 .462 .564 42 
       
Total average grade 
accumulated in the 
student’s career 
8.109 7.74 -.369 .506 .470 42 
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Figure 1 - Timeline of the Program and Data Collection 
 
 
 
1st week of 
classes in 
August 2012 
Baseline Survey 
2ndweek of 
classes in 
August 2012 
Randomization 
and start of the 
program 
15thweek of 
classes in 
November 2012 
Follow-up surveys 
and end of the 
courses 
Final Exams 
Students may take 
the exam in any of 
these possible calls: 
December 2012, 
February 2013 and 
March 2013. 
